NextGenSOCOM (Pt. II)
The Coming Divide - integration matters
What role special operations will need to play in the coming war
Ethan Brown
Winning the next war is going to come down to a simple paradigm: the force with greater mobility and modularity has an advantage, as both aggressors and defenders will be forced to contend with the tyranny of distance, sustainment, and speed. Mobility and modularity—the capacity to move and integrate seamlessly despite operational diversity—is the key to achieving that goal.
No amount of strategy or wargaming can ever hope to anticipate the explicit parameters of the next conflict. That next fight will certainly challenge American and allied forces in terms of logistics, operating in denied zones, and in new and untested domains. Platforms like information, cyber and electronic warfare, machine- and AI-driven decision cycles, and prolific dependence on technology will reshape confrontation between states and sub-state actors.
Tools and silver bullets are not going to solve the complex problem. Rather, continuing to build on the Joint Force foundation built during the Global War on Terror, and fusing warfighting capabilities at the unit levels is the best means of improving adaptation and speed in such a conflict.
The old ways are dying
Somewhere in this puzzle, special operations forces will play a pivotal role, albeit unlike the main effort that the enterprise assumed during the waning years of the War on Terror. In that war, the need to navigate the politically sensitive and civilian-dominated battlespace against insurgent groups and non-state actors required a far more precise and refined tactics, techniques, and procedures, in addition to far more exclusive capabilities not typically associated with mass-maneuver forces.
In Afghanistan and Iraq, special operations forces became the primary tool of making war, and the bulk of the coalition war machine evolved to enable those elite forces in combating the adversary. In the next war, the inverse is true, where large(ish) scale conventional forces will be called upon to wage a far more ‘traditional’ type of Major Combat Operation (MCO); the defense enterprise is no longer hunting small cells and dismantling networks, it is seeking high-value, high-payoff strategic hubs, interdicting adversary supply and sustainment capabilities, and competing with weapons of range and yield.
The reality here is that special operations components will still have a pivotal role to play across the maritime and varying land warfare climes of the future conflict. But the mindset shift required to remain relevant is key: SOF elements will necessarily become a supporting role to the conventional force engaged in MCO combat.
But this isn’t a reflection of “going back to the Cold War” because that world, adversaries, technology and paradigm no longer exists. Today’s battlegrounds are faster and more dependent on the skies above Terra and the data bytes of networks than anything seen in the clash with the former Soviet collective. The defense enterprise of the Cold War also saw its service branches remain largely tribalized and in stark contrast to Joint interoperability until the conditions of GWOT forced a necessary change.
It is the nexus of these two realities—a needed evolution on the role of SOF components and the complexity of the future fight, that will require the Special Operations enterprise to reinvent itself in ways which may be an uncomfortable premise for members of the enterprise.
Enable and integrate
There are two components to the necessary change: first, SOF must prioritize its multitude of capabilities as enablers of the Joint conventional force. As opposed to retaining the role of primary effort, the enterprise must examine how it can best perform a supporting function to the All-Domain Operations (ADO) concept. Second, doing so requires that the various service component Special Operations Commands do not stigmatize into unilateral isolation ahead of the changing of the warfighting environment.
One of the single most impactful outcomes of the Global War on Terror was the prevalence of Joint operations to scale and depth that the DoD had never before achieved. Much of this fusion was born on the backs of Joint Special Operations teams integrating with and across the force to adapt to the new and evolving threat of violent extremism.
With the next conflict uncertain, but instability and threats to the international order compounding across the Indo-Pacific, Africa, the North and South Poles, the need for SOF components to maneuver and conduct their brand of specialized missions will remain dependent on conventional forces for mobility and sustainment. Yet those special units will necessarily need to focus on how their capabilities achieve operational and strategic objectives for combatant and geographic commanders.
Affecting the next war
Comparatively, a nighttime raid in Syria to eliminate an ISIS cell-leader signified the primary mission of US SOF in the counter-terror war paradigm. But how does this capability apply to a Joint SOF element tasked to support the collaborative defense Japan’s far-reaching island chains with other US forces?
In some cases, returning to traditional SOF-typecasts is relevant guidance for force development, including targeting adversary centers of gravity, combat search-and-rescue, and irregular warfare as a means of undermining the enemy freedom of maneuver and degrading its ability to wage war. But once again, the tyranny of distance plays a major part of the discussion. Herein lies the key point of the thesis: SOF units are unlikely to enjoy unilateral operational requirements, and instead must anticipate being much more closely integrated into the broader MCO force tasked with deterrence and combat operations.
The emphasis on technology and capabilities-driven force organization provides a key point for the DoD to focus on when it comes to preparing its forces for that future fight in new and challenging mediums. Various services are exploring ways and means for deepening integration, shortening the decision cycle, and fusing sensors across the force; JADC2 and All-Domain Operations headline this effort to ensure timely and accurate information for the combined forces who will deploy and sustain in threat areas. Here too, does SOF have a role as expanded sensors, data collection and reconnaissance, and the ability to harass and interdict opponents beyond and within the denied zones.
The key difference, however, despite the grandeur of such behind-the-lines exploits, is that these missions would and must remain a supplemental—critical—enabling role to support the broader conventional force.
Battle-damage assessment
There will never be a decrease in the need, utilitarian value, or adaptability of US and coalition special operations forces. Those components of the security enterprise have proven time and time again their critical capabilities in pursuing strategic national security objectives as a tactical element of the force.
But the future environments where American and partner interests lie will require that these same forces reorganize themselves to account for the requirements of American warfighting capabilities. GWOT inculcated a primacy shift in the warfighter units who closed with and engaged the enemy; in the next fight, while SOF is certain to play key roles, SOFs most effective role will be in supporting the conventional Joint Force and focusing on integration agnostic of uniform color, service branch, or counter-terror paradigms that once shaped the enterprise.
